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This paper develops a model of a monopolistically competitive industry with extensive and 
intensive business investment and shows how these margins respond to changes in average 
and marginal corporate tax rates. Intensive investment refers to the size of a firm’s capital 
stock. Extensive investment refers to the firm’s production location and reflects the trade-off 
between exports and foreign direct investment as alternative modes of foreign market access. 
The paper derives comparative static effects of the corporate tax and shows how the cost of 
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With increasing mobility of ﬁrms, international competitiveness has become a dominating
concern in tax reform. Policy makers give priori t yt oc r e a t i n gaf a v o r a b l et a xe n v i r o n m e n t
to attract internationally mobile ﬁrms. It is believed that a company’s average tax rate
is the decisive measure when a country wants to become more attractive as a location of
foreign direct investment (FDI). A low eﬀective average tax rate (EATR), compared to
other countries, helps to keep mobile ﬁrms at home and thus reduces outbound FDI. The
EATR refers to discrete location choice or the extensive margin of capital formation. The
eﬀective marginal tax rate (EMTR), in contrast, refers to the intensive margin, making
existing ﬁr m sg r o wl a r g e r . T h eE M T Ri st h u sb e l i e v e dt ob er e l e v a n tf o rt h eg r o w t h
of domestic businesses which refrain from FDI and, if at all, serve foreign markets via
exports. The voluminous study of the European Commission (2001) on company taxation
in Europe has provided detailed compilations of EMTRs and EATRs in an intra-European
and world wide comparison.1 The measurement of eﬀective tax rates is summarized by
Devereux and Griﬃth (2003) and Sorensen (2004).
Much of the international tax literature (see the reviews of Gordon and Hines, 2002,
Gresik, 2001, Weichenrieder, 1995, and Janeba, 1997, or the papers by Hauﬂer and
Schjelderup, 2000, and Davies, 2004, to mention a few contributions) postulates that
multinational investment ﬂows occur until the marginal product of capital is equalized
across countries. Taxes may drive a wedge between gross returns across countries and
thereby lead to an ineﬃcient international allocation of capital. However, it is not pos-
sible to rationalize the role of EATRs in a framework that allows only for marginal in-
vestments but excludes the discrete nature of FDI. Inspired by empirical work of Hines
1Tax reform increasingly aims to create an internationally more competitive tax environment and
tends to focus on EATRs. The German Council of Economic Advisors (GCEA et al., 2006), for example,
compiles and internationally compares EATRs to show how its proposal improves Germany’s ranking.
The role of EMTRs for investment of nationally operating ﬁrms are relatively neglected. The U.S. has
also become more concerned with the international impact of taxes, see the President’s Advisory Panel
on Federal Tax Reform (2006). For Canada, see the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1997).
1(1996), Devereux and Griﬃth (1998) and others (see Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm, 2002,
and Devereux, 2007, for reviews), the recent theoretical literature has studied models of
FDI in imperfectly competitive markets to investigate the impact of taxes on discrete lo-
cation choice (see Devereux and Hubbard, 2003, Fuest, 2005, or Bond, 2000, for an early
discussion). These papers tend to disregard the intensive margin of business investment
which remains very important for immobile national ﬁrms. Razin and Sadka (2007a,b)
have developed a model of heterogeneous ﬁrms including location choice and intensive
investment as well. They use the framework to guide empirical estimation and to sim-
ulate the consequences of tax competition and harmonization. They are not concerned
to analytically demonstrate the separate role of extensive and intensive investment for
national capital formation and the cost of public funds.
The literature on corporate taxation does not explain very well, if at all, how the
measures of EMTRs and EATRs play together with extensive and intensive behavioral
elasticities to determine the net impact on national investment. Domestic capital forma-
tion results from the net impact on expansion investment of local production units and
FDI reﬂecting the relocation decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). It is even less
known how the behavioral responses on these two margins determine the cost of public
funds as created by the corporate income tax. The present paper ﬁlls this gap. It shows
how national capital formation depends both on the scale and location of discrete business
investments, and how the cost of public funds from corporate taxation must be computed
to reﬂect the behavioral elasticities of discrete and marginal investment.
To augment the traditional investment model by an extensive margin, the paper draws
on new trade theory which emphasizes ﬁrm heterogeneity and explains how ﬁrms choose
between exports and FDI as alternative means to serve foreign markets (see Melitz, 2003,
Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl, 2006, Helpman, 2006, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple, 2004,
Baldwin, 2005, and Baldwin and Forslid, 2004, among others). We develop a much sim-
pliﬁed, probabilistic version of the “Melitz model”. We also formulate an intertemporal
version with capital while the original Melitz model is static with labor being the only
2factor. Heterogeneous success probabilities in foreign market entry replace the produc-
tivity diﬀerences in the Melitz model.2 The symmetry of ﬁrms with respect to all other
characteristics keeps the model very tractable. Given extra ﬁxed costs of FDI, only ﬁrms
with a high success probability of entering foreign markets will prefer FDI over exports.
Firms with a low success probability will not be able to break even on FDI since FDI
must also pay back the ﬁxed cost of establishing foreign subsidiaries. The choice between
FDI and exports reﬂects a proximity concentration trade-oﬀ: FDI saves transport costs
but duplicates production and ﬁxed costs.
The fraction of ﬁrms choosing FDI over exports and domestic production deﬁnes the
extensive margin of investment. It will be shown how the corporate tax, depending on the
King-Fullerton-Jorgensen EMTR measure, aﬀects intensive investment and ﬁrm size by
inﬂating the user cost of capital. It is also shown how the tax, depending on the implied
EATR, diminishes ﬁrm values from export production relative to ﬁrm values from foreign
subsidiary production. The corporate tax thus aﬀects extensive investment by reducing
the value of export production and inducing more ﬁrms to locate abroad. The empirical
investigation of Buettner and Ruf (2007) is much in line with the themes of this paper.
They show how the corporate tax aﬀects the scale of multinational investment via the
EMTR measure while location is sensitive to the statutory tax rate which is a good proxy
for the EATR (see also Buettner and Wamser, 2006, on the role of other taxes). This
paper ﬁnally derives a welfare based measure of the cost of public funds that will depend
on the extensive and intensive elasticities and the two measures of eﬀective tax rates.
The paper ﬁrst sets up in section 2 the basic framework. Section 3 states comparative
static results and characterizes the costs of public funds. Section 4 concludes.
2Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) emphasize that, empirically, more productive ﬁrms are “more
likely” to start exporting. High productivity does not deterministically imply export status. Export status
is only more frequent, or more likely, among these ﬁrms. This lends some realism to our probabilistic
formulation. Grossman and Helpman (2004) also include success probabilities to clarify the role of
managerial incentives, although again ﬁrm heterogeneity is in factor productivity.
32 The Model
The argument is based on a simple two period model of a small economy with monopolistic
competition and variable outbound FDI.3 In the ﬁrst period, a ﬁxed labor endowment is
employed to produce a traditional good (numeraire) which can be consumed or invested.
The traditional sector employs a Ricardian technology with a unit labor coeﬃcient and
p a y saw a g er a t eo fo n e .Aﬁxed number of n industrial ﬁrms each invests capital (standard
g o o d )i np e r i o do n et os u p p l yd i ﬀerentiated goods in period two. Each ﬁrm is endowed
with a worldwide patent for a speciﬁc brand which is a close substitute for other varieties.
The ﬁrm faces demand worldwide and produces under conditions of monopolistic compe-
tition. A key business choice is whether ﬁrms should serve the foreign market via exports
from home subject to transport costs. Alternatively, they could save on transport costs
by relocating production abroad and serving the market locally. However, establishing a
foreign subsidiary company requires extra administrative and other ﬁxed costs.
Decision making by ﬁrms follows a logical sequence. To begin with, ﬁrms inherit a
product design from past innovation and a probability that the product will actually be
valued by consumers. To keep things simple, we assume that a new product designed
by domestic ﬁrms always appeals to consumers in the home market. Firms then invest
in a production unit and ﬁnally supply the market. In contrast, the ﬁrm may or may
not be able to penetrate the foreign market. The success probability of foreign market
introduction varies among the ﬁxed number of brands. Firms must ﬁrst decide whether
they serve foreign markets with exports or FDI. Second, after they spend the relevant
ﬁxed cost to prepare market entry, the success of market introduction becomes known.
If entry fails, the ﬁxed cost is wasted. Third, when the market is successfully developed,
they choose capital investment (at home or abroad, depending on the export FDI choice)
which ﬁxes plant size and sales volume. Fourth, ﬁrms distribute proﬁts and consumers
allocate income to innovative and traditional goods. The presentation of the model follows
the principle of backward induction and starts with consumer choice.
3For simplicity, we consider only outbound FDI by domestic ﬁrms and disregard inbound FDI.
42.1 Demand
Domestic households are endowed with ﬁxed labor L in the ﬁrst period, earning a wage
w =1per unit. Households spend labor income on consumption C1 of the standard good
(numeraire) and save the rest. In the second period, savings S yield total wealth RS
including interest r where R =1+r. In addition, agents receive proﬁts πe from ownership
of monopolistic ﬁrms and get lump-sum transfers z from the government. They spend
C2 on consumption of the traditional good and E on their purchases of n diﬀerentiated
goods. Each brand is available at a producer price pj a n di sc o n s u m e di nq u a n t i t ycj.
Spending is constrained by ﬁrst and second period budgets
C1 = L − S, C2 + E = RS + π
e + z, E =
Z n
0
(1 − ν)pjcjdj = n(1 − v)pc. (2.1)
T h el a s te q u a l i t yr e ﬂects the symmetric nature of preferences and costs. We also include a
demand subsidy for diﬀerentiated goods at rate v. The subsidy is merely a technical device
that serves to eliminate the markup pricing distortion if needed (see e.g. Keuschnigg,
1998). Given producer prices pj, the consumer price is reduced to (1 − v)pj. Eliminating
savings yields the intertemporal budget constraint. It will be convenient to express it in
second period units, RC1 + C2 + E = LR + πe + z.
Assuming linearly separable preferences, present and future consumption are perfect
substitutes. The interest rate r must thus be equal to the subjective discount rate.
Consumers do not care when to consume but care only about total consumption. Life-
time utility in second period units is U = RC1 + C2 +
R n
0 u(cj)dj,o r
U = LR + π
e + z +
Z n
0
[u(cj) − (1 − ν)pjcj]dj. (2.2)
The square bracket gives consumer surplus from consumption of innovative goods. De-
mand follows from utility maximization which results in (1 − ν)pj = u0 (cj).4 Special-
izing to u(cj)=A1−α · (cj)
α /α, 0 <α<1, and denoting the price elasticity by
4Following Krugman (1980), we have assumed additively separable preferences for diﬀerentiated goods.
For this reason, the demand function does not include a price index.
5ε =1 /(1 − α) > 1, domestic demand for brand j is











F o r e i g nd e m a n di sm a r k e db ya nu p p e ri n d e xf and stems from similar preferences. In the
foreign economy, households consume traditional and innovative goods while producers
are specialized in the numeraire good only. However, the foreign economy also hosts
incoming FDI to manufacture diﬀerentiated goods locally. The Appendix establishes
general equilibrium of the world economy.
2.2 Home Market Production
Firms always produce for the home market but serve the foreign market only when market
access is successful. To supply the home market, ﬁrm j invests kj units of the standard
good in the ﬁrst period. Anticipating symmetry, we suppress the variety index j.S i n c e
capital does not depreciate, investment yields k units of the standard good in the second
period. At the same time, capital is used to produce k units of a diﬀerentiated good. The
monopolistic ﬁrm supplies the entire domestic market, c = k, and earns revenues pk.5 The
government levies a corporate proﬁtt a xa tr a t et but allows deduction of ek from the tax
base. When e =1 , ﬁrms can fully deduct investment, making the corporate tax a cash-
ﬂow tax. If e<1, the tax discriminates against investment. The discounted present value
of the ﬁrm’s production for the home market is [(1 − t)pk +( 1− et)k]/R − (1 − et)k.
Measured in units of the second period, ﬁrm value is
π =( 1− t)pk − (1 − et)rk. (2.4)
In period two, tax revenue amounts to πT = t(pk + ek) − tekR = t(p − er)k.
In solving for optimal investment, the ﬁrm takes account of its monopoly position
c = k in the market for her brand. Using (2.3), the revenue function is seen to be concave
5In the absence of taxes, the present value of a ﬁrm with investment k is (pk + k)/R−k which amounts
to π = pk − rk if expressed in second period values. Mark-up pricing over marginal cost, p>r , yields
strictly positive proﬁts indicating an excess return on capital over its user cost r.
6in capital,6 p(k)k = kα·A1−α/(1 − ν). Alternatively, using k = A/[(1 − ν)p]
ε,t h eﬁrm’s
revenue from domestic sales amounts to
p · k = A · (1 − ν)
−ε · p
1−ε. (2.5)
Slightly rewriting (2.4), the monopolistically competitive ﬁrm’s investment follows from
π =m a x
k




where u stands for the user cost of capital. Taking account of the fact that any increased
output from additional investment reduces the producer price p, the optimality condition
becomes p − u + k · dp/dk =0 . Using the price elasticity given in (2.3) yields
α · p(k)=u, k = A · (α/[(1 − ν)u])
ε . (2.7)
The ﬁrm invests until marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Consequently, the
p r i c eo ft h ev a r i e t yi saﬁxed markup 1/α over the user cost of capital. The demand
curve determines the level of sales at this price which, in turn, yields output and capital
invested. A closed form solution for proﬁt si sf o u n dw h e nu s i n gαp = u to substitute
out u in (2.6) which yields π =( 1− t)(1− α)pk. Replace pk by (2.5) and again use the
markup p = u/α to arrive at
π =( 1− t)B/u
ε−1,B ≡ (1 − α)Aα
ε−1/(1 − ν)
ε . (2.8)
2.3 Foreign Market Entry
A domestic ﬁrm with a given product design can sell its brand worldwide. Suppose that
the ﬁrm has decided to serve the foreign market with exports and that foreign market
entry was successful. Exports involve real trade costs θ − 1 of shipping goods across
border. To cover transport cost, the foreign demand price must exceed the domestic
6For this reason, we can keep technology linear. A concave net output function f (k) would only
complicate the analysis without additional insights.
7producer price by a factor θ. For the same reason, an export ﬁrm must produce more
than what arrives at foreign consumers, kX >c X. The diﬀerence is lost on transport.
Given symmetry in export demand, we again suppress the variety index and write cX = c
f
j
etc. Foreign demand prices and domestic producer prices for exports are thus related by
pX = θp, kX = θcX,p X · cX = p · kX,θ ≥ 1. (2.9)
When the monopolistic ﬁrm successfully picks up export business, it must invest an
amount kX of the standard good to build the export plant and thereby obtains a value
πX in addition to the value π of its plant that produces for the home market,
πX =( 1− t)pkX − (1 − et)rkX =( 1− t)(p − u)kX. (2.10)
The exporting ﬁrm pays tax in the second period equal to πT
X = t(p − er)kX.
Since pX = θp, export demand is cX = Af/(θp)
ε, giving revenues pkX = Af/(θp)
ε−1.
By the same steps as before, exporters choose a markup over user cost of capital, p = u/α.
Proﬁts from export business thus amount to πX =( 1− t)(1− α)pkX or
πX =( 1− t)BX/u
ε−1,B X ≡ (1 − α)A
f (α/θ)
ε−1 . (2.11)
Instead of exporting to the foreign market, the ﬁrm could have chosen FDI by estab-
lishing a foreign subsidiary. Since the corporate tax is a source tax, proﬁts of the foreign
subsidiary are subject to the foreign corporate tax which might result in double taxation
of proﬁts upon repatriation. The most commonly adopted rule in the taxation of MNEs is
the exemption principle whereby proﬁts of foreign subsidiaries are exempt from corporate
tax in the parent country. Since the analysis in this paper keeps foreign taxes constant
and is exclusively concerned with the intensive and extensive investment response to the
domestic corporate tax, it is useful to entirely suppress foreign taxes. With a zero foreign
tax rate and exemption at home, the user cost of capital invested abroad is equal to the
foreign interest rate, uf = r, which is, by assumption, equal to domestic interest.7
7If the home country applies the deduction or credit method in taxing foreign source proﬁts, some
double taxation might result. In such cases, the domestic tax rate also determines the cost of foreign
invested capital and thereby changes, to some extent, the tax impact on the exports FDI choice.
8Having opted for FDI to serve the foreign market, the ﬁrm saves on transport costs.
Compared to an export ﬁrm, it can charge a lower price pI to foreign customers which
boosts sales. The value of the foreign subsidiary to the domestic parent company is
πI =( pI − r)kI. (2.12)
The export versus FDI decision explained below will be well behaved only if πI >π X.
Local production abroad saves transport cost which allows a lower demand price and thus
boosts sales and proﬁts, making FDI relatively more proﬁtable compared to exporting.8
2.4 Exports Versus FDI
The key element of the model refers to the choice of domestic ﬁrms to serve foreign
markets via two rivaling modes: exports or FDI.9 The decision deﬁnes the extensive
margin of investment by relocating production and investing abroad if exporting becomes
less attractive than foreign subsidiary production. The simplest approach is to assume
that foreign market entry is risky and ﬁrms succeed only with probability q.A l l ﬁrms
attempt foreign market entry but some will not be successful so that there is a margin of
purely local ﬁrms that earn π only. If market entry fails, the ﬁxed cost spent on preparing
market access is lost. Total proﬁt of successful ﬁrms from global sales amount to π + πX
8By similar steps as before, foreign subsidiaries set a markup of producer price over foreign user cost
as in (2.7), αpI = r.T h ep r o ﬁtt h u si sπI =( 1− α)pIkI =( 1− α)Af (α/r)
ε−1. Comparing closed form
proﬁts, the inequality is equivalent to 1/rε−1 > (1 − t)/(θu)
ε−1.I t i s s a t i s ﬁed in the absence of tax
where u = r. If real trade costs are positive, θ>1, the condition reduces to 1 > 1/θ
ε−1 and is necessarily
fulﬁlled since ε>1 as well. If taxes are not too large, the inequality also holds with positive taxes.
9To endogenize this margin, we choose a much simpliﬁed “Melitz model” of monopolistic competition
(see Melitz, 2003). Instead of considering ﬁrm heterogeneity in labor productivity, giving rise to a
distribution of unit costs, prices, demand and ﬁrm size, we assume identical productivity across ﬁrms and
keep the production and demand side symmetric. The only heterogeneity is the risk of foreign market
entry. Our assumptions much increase analytical tractability which has plagued the applications of the
Melitz model. One disadvantage is that we cannot capture how trade and ﬁscal policy change aggregate
productivity by aﬀecting ﬁrm composition. However, this aspect is not the focus of the paper.
9for exporters and π + πI for a multinational company with foreign subsidiaries. Ex ante,
when foreign market entry is still uncertain, the expected value of global sales is
¯ πX = π + q · πX, ¯ πI = π + q · πI. (2.13)
Preparing foreign market entry requires some ﬁxed costs such as building a distribution
network, fulﬁlling foreign regulations etc. They are normalized to zero for exports, fX =0 ,
making exports the default mode.10 Opting for FDI by establishing a foreign subsidiary
is more expensive. Suppose there are diﬀerential ﬁxed costs fI relating to FDI. Ex ante,
before the success of market entry is known, the expected present value of a foreign
subsidiary, net of these ﬁxed costs, would be q · πI/R − fI. In terms of second period
values it amounts to q · πI − F where F ≡ RfI.
As a result of past innovation, new product designs are endowed with variable prob-
abilities q.T h e e x t r a ﬁxed cost F necessary for FDI is lost without any gain if market
entry fails. FDI is thus worthwhile only for products with a suﬃciently high probability
of foreign market access. The critical, indiﬀerent ﬁrm is deﬁned by
q
∗ · (πI − πX)=F, F ≡ fIR. (2.14)
Figure 1 illustrates the choice between exports and FDI. Since exports involve trans-
port costs, variable proﬁts are larger when producing locally, πI >π X. FDI, however,
creates higher ﬁxed costs. If a ﬁrm will be successful in introducing her brand in the
foreign market with a low probability q only, the diﬀerential proﬁt πI −πX from FDI will
materialize only rarely while the ﬁxed cost of establishing the subsidiary is necessary in
any case. Choosing FDI instead of exports is thus not proﬁtable for ﬁrms which stand a
low chance of successful foreign market access.
An innovation results in a new specialized brand with uncertain market prospects.
Some brands are more appealing to consumers than others. We assume that each brand
10If fX were positive, some ﬁrms would not attempt foreign market entry at all and choose to stay
local from the beginning.
10is drawn from a pool of possible innovations where the success probability q is represented
with density g(q), yielding a cumulative distribution G(q)=
R q
0 g(q0)dq0. Given (a ﬁxed
number of) n independent innovations, the mass of ﬁrms with success probability q is
g(q)n. According to Figure 1 and equation (2.14), all ﬁrms with success probabilities
smaller than the critical one, q<q ∗,c h o o s ee x p o r t s ,t h er e s to p t sf o rF D I .I nt h ea g g r e -
gate, of all n domestic ﬁrms, a share sF invests the necessary ﬁxed cost F and attempts
FDI. The remaining share 1 − sF opts for the export strategy.
F
* q 1 exports
I qF π ⋅−
FDI
X q π ⋅
F i g .1 :E x p o r t sV e r s u sF D I
Since foreign market entry is risky and fails with probability q, the fraction of successful
market entrants is much smaller, i.e. sI <s F, sX < 1 − sF and thereby sI + sX < 1.
The remaining part 1 − sI − sX is not successful in penetrating foreign markets, stays
national and serves only the local market. Therefore, the range of goods available abroad











Each ﬁrm earns strictly positive rents in the second period. Domestic households
collect proﬁts with a total value of πe. From now on, we normalize the mass of ﬁrms to
11unity, n =1 ,s ot h a tsX denotes the mass as well as the share of exporters:
π
e = π + sX · πX + VI,V I =
R 1
q∗ (q · πI − F)dG(q)=sI · πI − sF · F. (2.16)
The aggregate value of repatriated proﬁts from foreign subsidiaries, net of ﬁxed costs spent
abroad, is VI.R e p a t r i a t e dp r o ﬁts are part of the economy’s net foreign factor income.
2.5 General Equilibrium
The government is assumed to refund tax revenue in the second period net of the demand
subsidy as lump-sum transfers to households. Since corporate tax revenue stems only
from ﬁrms producing at home, the public sector budget is
z = t · (p − er)K − νpc, K ≡ k + sXkX. (2.17)
The aggregate domestic capital stock reﬂects investments in all plants that serve the
domestic market and those that produce for exports. Outbound FDI of domestic MNEs
equal to sIkI adds to the foreign country’s capital stock. Intensive investment relates to
t h es i z eo fp l a n t sl o c a t e da th o m e ,k and kX. Extensive investment reﬂects relocation
of production to the foreign country as a result of the export FDI choice illustrated in
Figure 1, and is felt in a smaller or larger number sX of export plants located at home
rather than abroad. The appendix in Keuschnigg (2006) derives the aggregate savings
investment identity and the wolrd output market equilibrium.
3 Impact and Cost of Corporate Taxation
The purpose of the paper is twofold. We ﬁrst show how the measures of eﬀective marginal
and average tax rates, EMTRs and EATRs, interact to determine the net impact on
national investment. We will ﬁnd an important interaction. The EMTR not only aﬀects
intensive but also extensive investment by its impact on plant size. Next, the paper shows
how the excess burden of the corporate tax is measured, using the eﬀective tax rates and
appropriately deﬁned behavioral elasticities.
123.1 Eﬀective Average and Marginal Tax Rates
The EMTR measures the tax burden on marginal investment. The tax drives a wedge
between the pre-tax return or cost of capital u, equal to marginal revenue αp,a n dt h e
after tax return r. In pushing up the pre-tax return, it makes the last units of investment











The EMTR relates gross and net returns by r =( 1− tm)u and summarizes all relevant
parameters of the tax code in a single measure of the distortion on the intensive margin.
It is well known that immediate expensing (e =1 ) transforms the corporate tax into a
cash-ﬂow tax and consequently results in a zero EMTR. When there is no expensing at
all, e =0 , the EMTR coincides with the statutory tax rate, tm = t.
The EATR measures total taxes paid as a share of gross income. In an intertemporal
model, the relevant concept is the ratio of the present value of tax liability over the gross,
social present value of the ﬁrm. Using (2.4), the relevant values in second period units






· t, 1 − ta =
π




With π∗ being the gross value of the ﬁrm, net proﬁts and tax payments are π =( 1− ta)π∗
and πT = taπ∗ where π∗ = π + πT.
To derive comparative static eﬀects of tax reform, we compute changes of variables
relative to their values in the initial equilibrium. The hat notation indicates relative
changes such as ˆ u ≡ du/u. The exceptions are changes in tax rates which are expressed
relative to net of tax prices, e.g. ˆ tm ≡ dtm/(1 − tm).S i n c e(1 − tm)u = r and the markup
is constant, user cost and producer price change in proportion to the EMTR,
ˆ p =ˆ u = ˆ tm. (3.3)
How are the eﬀective rates changed by an increase in the statutory rate? The EATR
is an endogenous tax measure that must be determined jointly with the impact of taxes
13on equilibrium. Its relative change is found by log-linearizing the equation for 1 − ta in




p−r. Appropriately expanding and noting (3.3) gives
ˆ ta = ˆ t +
r
p − r
· ˆ tm, ˆ tm =
1 − e
1 − et
· ˆ t. (3.4)
A ﬁrst insight is that the statutory rate changes the EATR, as deﬁn e di n( 3 . 2 ) ,b o t h
directly as well as indirectly via its impact on the EMTR which pushes up the user
cost and, via markup pricing, the variety prices. Quite intuitively, a cash-ﬂow tax with
immediate expensing is neutral on the intensive margin. In this case, the EATR is identical
to the statutory rate, ˆ tm =0and ˆ ta = ˆ t.
3.2 Investment and Proﬁts
The EMTR pushes up the user cost of capital and leads ﬁrms to charge higher prices. To
sustain higher prices, the monopolist must cut back sales and invests less. By the demand
curve in (2.3),
ˆ k = −ε · ˆ p = −ε · ˆ tm. (3.5)
The ﬁrm’s net of tax proﬁt depends both on the average and marginal tax rates. To
see this, note that gross proﬁti sπ∗ =( p − r)k,l e a v i n gan e to ft a xp r o ﬁt π =( 1− ta)π∗.
Gross proﬁt in log-linearized form is ˆ π
∗ =
p
p−r · ˆ p + ˆ k. Substitute the preceding results,
ˆ π =ˆ π






· ˆ tm − ˆ ta = −
p − er
p − u
· ˆ t, ˆ πX =ˆ π. (3.6)
To obtain the third equality, use ε =1 /(1 − α) and eliminate α by the condition (2.7)
to get ε = p/(p − u). Insert this and ˆ ta from (3.4) into the round bracket which yields
ˆ π = − u
p−uˆ tm − ˆ t.S u b s t i t u t e n o w f o r ˆ tm and use u from (2.6) to obtain, after some
rearrangements, the result. The third equality states the net eﬀect which is induced by
the statutory rate. It is also directly obtained by applying the envelope theorem to (2.4),
dπ/dt = −(p − er)k, and dividing this by π =( 1− t)(p − u)k.Ac a s h - ﬂow tax implies
e =1and u = r, yielding tm =0and ta = t. It is not distorting intensive investment. An
14increase in the statutory rate would thus leave gross proﬁtu n a ﬀected, ˆ π
∗ =0 ,a n dr e d u c e
net of tax proﬁtb yˆ π = −ˆ ta = −ˆ t.
Other things being constant, an increase in the statutory tax rate reduces exporting
proﬁts in exactly the same way. Although the level of demand is diﬀerent, the relative
change in net proﬁts is the same because the demand elasticity is identical in home
and foreign markets. Assuming that the home country applies the exemption method
to avoid double taxation, proﬁts of foreign subsidiaries net of foreign corporate tax are
exempted at home. Hence, proﬁts πI from FDI are unaﬀected by domestic taxation,
see (2.12). Investment of foreign subsidiaries depends only on foreign user cost that is
possibly inﬂated by foreign taxes but does not change with home taxes.
The FDI export trade-oﬀ is illustrated in Figure 1 and formally resolved by ﬁxing the
cut-oﬀ value q∗ in (2.14). Log-diﬀerentiating yields ˆ q∗ =ˆ πX · πX/(πI − πX) since proﬁts
πI of foreign subsidiaries are exogenous from the home economy’s perspective. Inserting





· ˆ πX, ˆ πX = −
p − er
p − u
· ˆ t. (3.7)
Domestic corporate taxation raises outbound FDI for two reasons. First, it raises
the EATR and thereby reduces the net of tax proﬁt from exporting, making it more
attractive to serve foreign markets via FDI. Second, it also raises the EMTR, thereby
impairing investment and company growth and reducing proﬁts from domestic export
production. The net eﬀect is given in (3.6) and makes exports less proﬁtable relative to
the FDI alternative. In reducing the cut-oﬀ v a l u et h a ti d e n t i ﬁes the critical ﬁrm, the tax
shrinks the number of domestically producing exporters. As more ﬁrms decide to serve
foreign demand locally by relocating production abroad, the decomposition of ﬁrms into
exporters and multinationals changes in favor of MNEs. Applying the Leibnitz rule of
diﬀerentiating integrals to (2.15) yields dsX/dq∗ = q∗g(q∗), and similarly for the other
shares. Expressing in relative changes gives
ˆ sX = µX · ˆ q
∗, ˆ sI = −µI · ˆ q
∗, ˆ sF = −µF · ˆ q
∗, (3.8)
15where the coeﬃcients µX ≡ (q∗)
2 g(q∗)/sX, µI ≡ (q∗)
2 g(q∗)/sI and µF ≡ q∗g(q∗)/sF
are deﬁned as positive values.
Aggregate national investment reﬂects intensive (via k and kX) and extensive invest-
ment (via sX). Noting ˆ k = ˆ kX, linearization of national investment in (2.17) yields
ˆ K = ˆ k +
sXkX
K






A higher corporate tax rate inﬂates the user cost of capital, suppresses business growth
and distorts intensive investment. A higher tax rate also reduces proﬁts from exporting
relative to FDI and thereby distorts extensive investment. When exports become less
proﬁt a b l er e l a t i v et oF D I ,m o r eﬁrms decide to relocate production and investment by
establishing a subsidiary company close to foreign customers.
Proﬁts of exporters and MNEs are diﬀerent since only exporters are subject to trans-
port costs and must therefore charge higher prices. Consequently, sales and proﬁts are
smaller. The corporate tax might thus aﬀect aggregate proﬁts πe not only by diminishing
the value of export proﬁts but also by aﬀecting ﬁrm composition. By (3.8), the eﬀect of
the cut-oﬀ probability on ﬁrm shares satisﬁes dsX = −dsI = −q∗dsF. Hence, expected
proﬁts in (2.16) change by πeˆ π
e = πˆ π + sXπXˆ πX +[ q∗ · (πI − πX) − F]dsF.T h e l a s t
bracket is zero due to the endogenous export FDI choice. Substituting out the change in
proﬁts as in (3.6) yields
π
eˆ π
e = −(π + sXπX) ·
p − er
p − u
· ˆ t. (3.10)
3.3 Cost of Public Funds
The deadweight loss of the corporate tax reﬂects the fact that the income equivalent
welfare loss imposed on the private sector exceeds the extra tax revenue that is raised
by government. To quantify the diﬀerence, it is convenient to deﬁne the tax base B and
rewrite tax revenue, net of the demand subsidy, as
z = t · B − ν · p · c, B ≡ (p − er)K. (3.11)
16Corporate tax revenue is T = t·B and changes by dT =( 1− t)B
h
ˆ t + t
1−t ˆ B
i
.T h et a x
base responds to both ﬁrm size and location choice. If investment shrinks on the extensive
margin, it leaves the margin p−er constant but erodes the tax base by lowering investment
K.S m a l l e rﬁrm size, however, not only reduces K but also comes with a countervailing
eﬀect on the tax base since reduced output boosts prices and thereby inﬂates the margin




ε)ˆ k+ηˆ πX.B y
earlier deﬁnitions, tax liability and net proﬁts of an export ﬁrm in terms of the average
tax rate are t(p − er)kX = taπ∗
X and (1 − t)(p − u)kX = πX =( 1− ta)π∗
X. Dividing




1−ta.P r o ﬁts in (3.7) thus change by t
1−tˆ πX = − ta
1−ta
ˆ t.
Substituting this together with ˆ k = −εˆ tm = −ε 1−e
1−etˆ t yields, upon using (3.1),
t
1 − t




















The paramter µ controls the elasticity of the tax base with respect to intensive investment.
With full expensing, e =1 , the user cost is equal to interest. Markup pricing yields
p/(p − r)=1 /(1 − α)=ε, giving µ =0 . If there are no investment deductions, e =0
and tm = t, µ = α so that tax base erosion due to reduced business growth is largest.
The change in corporate tax revenue noted after (3.11) thus becomes










· ˆ t. (3.13)
The ﬁrst term in the square bracket is simply the direct revenue eﬀect from raising the
tax rate. The second term relating to ε captures the distorting eﬀect of the tax rate on
intensive investment (or ﬁrm size) and on the producer price which both aﬀect the tax
base. The third term relating to η shows how a high statutory tax rate erodes the tax
base by reducing investment on the extensive margin, reﬂecting more outward FDI.
To characterize the deadweight loss, one starts by calculating the welfare change in
(2.2), dU = πeˆ π
e + dz − (1 − ν)cdp. The last term reﬂects the loss of consumer surplus
when the price marginally increases. To evaluate this formula, we ﬁrst show how net
proﬁts and tax base B are related,




17In consequence, the impact on total proﬁts in (3.10) is πeˆ π
e = −(1 − t)B · ˆ t.F u r t h e r ,
(3.11) implies a change in transfers to households equal to dz = dT−ν·d(pc). Substituting
these results and using c = k,a n dˆ p = −(1 − α)ˆ k from (2.4) together with ˆ k = −εˆ tm,
the welfare diﬀerential becomes
dU = −(1 − t)Bˆ t + dT − (1 − v − α) · pk · εˆ tm. (3.15)












ˆ t, Ω ≡






T h el a s tt e r mΩ in the bracket reﬂects the eﬀect of markup pricing on consumer surplus.
In reducing intensive investment, the tax reduces sales and thereby leads to higher prices
which cuts into consumer surplus. This could be oﬀset with an appropriate demand
subsidy, which would ensure (1 − ν)p = u and thereby equate consumer price to marginal
cost. Since markup pricing results in αp = u, the required subsidy would be 1−ν = α.I f
the demand subsidy were optimally chosen in the initial equilibrium, the pricing distortion
is eliminated (Ω =0 ). When the tax marginally increases the user cost and the producer
price, the welfare impact of the price increase is zero to the ﬁrst order. Of course, the
welfare loss also disappears with 1=e since in this case the tax does not distort intensive
investment, leaving user cost and producer price unaﬀected. The ﬁrst two terms in the
square bracket relate to the twofold investment distortion. The distortion on the intensive
margin depends on the EMTR and the intensive investment elasticity ε. The distortion
on the extensive margin depends on the EATR and the extensive elasticity η.
W ec a nn o wm e a s u r et h et a xd i s t o r t i o ni nt erms of the marginal deadweight loss per






1−tm · µε + ta
1−ta · η + Ω · ε
1 − tm
1−tm · µε − ta
1−ta · η
. (3.17)




1−tm · µε − ta
1−ta · η
. (3.18)
18Except for the extra term Ω referring to the markup pricing distortion, this formula is
entirely parallel to the analysis of intensive and extensive labor supply distortions. It
compares, for example, with MCPF formula of Kleven and Kreiner (2006) if one reduces
the household sector to only one income group. Their work is based on an earlier inﬂuential
contribution by Saez (2002), see also Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner and Saez (2007) and
Dahlby (2007) for related work.
To evaluate the formula more fully, it is useful to discuss two special cases. Consider
ﬁrst the case where ﬁxed costs of FDI are prohibitive which prevents any multinational
investment at all. Therefore, the share of successful exporters sX is ﬁxed (and sI = sF =0
in 2.14) which eliminates the extensive margin of investment, η =0 . One is exclusively
left with the standard distortion on the intensive margin where corporate taxation reduces






The cash-ﬂow tax (e =1 ) would be entirely neutral in this case, reducing tm and Ω to
zero. The tax is neutral not only with respect to intensive investment but thereby also
avoids the loss in consumer surplus from the pricing distortion.11 The marginal cost of
public funds would be one as with a lump-sum tax.
A second useful case to consider is an increase in the cash-ﬂow tax with immediate
expensing (e =1 ). The EMTR is kept to zero since the tax entirely avoids the intensive






The cash-ﬂow tax is thus not neutral in an economy with multinational investment. It
raises revenue from the taxation of inframarginal proﬁts which results in a substantial
EATR and thereby distorts location choice. The magnitude of the distortion and the cost
of public funds associated with the corporate tax depend on the EATR and the extensive
11The pricing distortion Ω could be eliminated in any case with a demand subsidy v =1− α.
19elasticity η. This elasticity is deﬁned in (3.9) and measures by how much aggregate
investment K declines as more ﬁrms relocate investment and production from home to
the foreign country in response to an increasing net of tax proﬁtd i ﬀerential πI − πX
between export and FDI sales.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
To the best of my knowledge, the public ﬁnance literature has not provided so far a
consistent characterization of the intensive and extensive investment distortions associated
with the corporate tax, or other taxes at the personal level which aﬀect ﬁrm values and
capital accumulation within ﬁrms. This gap is all the more serious since the policy oriented
discussion has recently assigned a very prominent role to the importance of EATRs (see,
for example, GCEA et al., 2006, or European Commission, 2001). The policy report
by the GCEA does not even present any detailed calculations of the proposed reform on
EMTRs but emphasizes much the reduction of EATRs. A ﬁrst insight from the theoretical
analysis is that, strictly speaking, the EATR is not an independent but an endogenous
tax measure that depends on the statutory tax rate as well as the EMTR. The eﬀective
marginal rate aﬀects ﬁrm growth and changes the ﬁrm’s gross of tax value and the present
value of tax payments. It thereby enters the EATR which is the ratio of these two values.
Traditional thinking is probably still much dominated by the excess burden associated
with intensive investment. The surveys of the empirical literature by Devereux (2007) and
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) ﬁnd that multinational investment responds sensitively to
measures of statutory and average tax rates, and is more elastic than standard estimates of
investment with respect to the user cost of capital suggest. The analyses of Buettner and
Ruf (2007) and Buettner and Wamser (2006) show that corporate taxes aﬀect both the
scale and location of multinational investment. Given the elastic investment response on
the extensive margin, the marginal cost of public funds due to the corporate tax must be
revised up quite substantially since the tax shrinks aggregate investment on two margins:
20First, all domestically active ﬁrms invest less. Second, some ﬁrms no longer build new
plants at home for export production but rather build them abroad to be closer to foreign
customers. The welfare cost of the corporate tax is therefore importantly related to the
size of the EATR and the extensive elasticity. This elasticity determines how many plants
are built abroad rather than at home in response to a tax induced increase in diﬀerential
net of tax proﬁts. The analysis showed how the marginal cost of corporate taxation
depends on the magnitude of eﬀective average and marginal tax rates and appropriately
deﬁned behavioral elasticities of intensive and extensive investment response.
Appendix
The appendix states world output market equilibrium. Substituting the savings invest-
ment identity S = K into the budget C1 = L − S in (2.1) gives domestic output market
equilibrium in the ﬁrst period,
C1 + K = L. (A.1)
GDP Y1 = L consists of traditional sector outputo n l ya n di ss p e n to nc o n s u m p t i o na n d
investment K. The model does not explain trade in the ﬁrst period.
The GNP identity of the second period follows upon inserting πe from (2.16) and
S = K = k + sXkX into the second period budget constraint (2.1). Using the proﬁt
deﬁnitions π and πX as well as the public sector budget (2.17) yields
C2 + pc = Y2 ≡ pK + K + VI. (A.2)
The ﬁrst two terms on the right side amount to domestic GDP consisting of the output
v a l u eo fi n n o v a t i v ea n dt r a d i t i o n a lg o o d s .T h el a s tt e r mi sp r o ﬁt repatriation from foreign
subsidiaries. Adding this to GDP gives domestic GNP Y2 which is equal to domestic
absorption. There are no imports of diﬀerentiated goods. Note that a monopolist supplies
t h ee n t i r em a r k e t ,c = k.U s i n gK = k + sXkX, the GNP equation is rearranged to give
(C2 − K) − sXpkX = VI. (A.3)
21The round bracket is imports of standard goods. The second term represents the value of
exports of diﬀerentiated goods. The trade balance deﬁcit (excess imports) must be equal
to foreign factor income which stems from proﬁt repatriations of foreign subsidiaries.
The foreign economy is endowed with ﬁxed labor Lf. It is specialized in the production
of the standard numeraire good and uses an investment technology that converts one
unit of the standard good today into R units tomorrow. There is no local innovate goods
production. Varieties consumed in the second period stem from imports or subsidiary
production of multinationals. Since foreign market entry is risky, not all varieties on oﬀer
i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ya r ea l s os u p p l i e da b r o a d .H e n c e ,nX +nI <n . Lower indices denote










f = nXpXcX + nIpIcI. (A.4)
Using the same speciﬁcation of utility as for domestic agents and noting the budget in
(A.1) yields foreign demand for brand j as in (2.3).
By the Ricardian technology, output in the ﬁrst period is equal to labor Lf. Without
trade, ﬁrst period output market equilibrium is Lf −C
f
1 = Sf = Kf +sIkI +sFfI,w h e r e
aggregate foreign savings must pay for local investment Kf plus investment demand
sIkI + sFfI from inbound FDI. Savings earn a return r and yield second period income
RSf derived from output of the standard good. Income is spent on standard goods and
on imported or FDI produced varieties. Foreign GNP amounts to Y
f
2 = RSf and is spent




2 +sXpXcX +sIpIcI.G N P
abroad is lower than GDP because of proﬁt repatriations leaving the country. To see this,
substitute savings Sf as noted above, expand by VI − VI,a n du s eVI from (2.16) and
πI =( pI − r)kI from (2.12), Y
f
2 = RSf = RKf +sIkI +sIpIkI −VI. Combining the two
equations for Y f and using the monopoly position cI = kI of foreign subsidiaries yields
the foreign trade balance,
RK
f + sIkI − C
f
2 = sXpXcX + VI. (A.5)
T h el e f ts i d ei sn e te x p o r t so fs t a n d a r dg o o d sw h i c hm u s tp a yf o ri m p o r t so fi n n o v a t i v e
22goods and proﬁt repatriations. Adding up (A.3) and (A.5) and noting cXpX = pkX yields







K. The right hand side stands for traditional goods output, with the ﬁrst bracketed term
referring to foreign and the second term to domestic output.
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